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CONSERVATIVE SOCIAL JUSTICE

JOHN WEHRL Y"

The term "conservative social justice" might be an oxymoron. "Social
justice" is often a catch phrase equated with the contemporary Liberal
platform that calls for State action to assist the poor. For this reason,
conservatives often disparage social justice. But what exactly this term
means is anyone's guess. In this essay I briefly examine what social justice
might mean in the context of the Western philosophical tradition, and then
try to discover what a "conservative" perspective might add to this
definition. I conclude that, in our postmodem world, it is only the
conservative who can coherently invoke "justice," and, thus, conservative
social justice may be the only honest form of social justice.
To determine what social justice means, it is necessary to define justice.
We will now turn to St. Thomas Aquinas because he accurately represents
the classical Western tradition: Justice is a virtue; and a virtue is a
disposition in a human being's will that inclines him to act rightly.' The
virtuous act in the case of justice is "to render to others their rights."2 The
rights of others are derived from nature and positive law.'
And if
something is incompatible with natural justice, positive law cannot make it
just.4 In other words, nature plays the primary role in the determination of
what is just.
Thomas also makes a distinction between two species of justice:
commutative and distributive.
Commutative justice regulates mutual
exchanges between two individual persons. Distributive justice regulates
the relationship of a whole to its parts (e.g., a polis to its citizens), and
generally it refers to the just distribution of common goods to individual
members. "Just" here is determined "geometrically," which means that
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2. Id. at Q. 58, A. 1.
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4. Id. at Q. 57, A. 2, Ad. 2.
5. Id.at Q. 61, A. 1.
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common goods ought to be distributed proportionately, according to the
contribution that each member made to the common good of the whole.6
The contemporary use of social justice is similar to this classical
understanding of distributive justice. Social justice today almost always
refers to the fulfillment of the economic or social rights of certain classes in
society, and generally the State is said to be responsible for securing these
rights. Distributive justice and social justice diverge, however, in how the
substance of these rights is determined. Distributive justice is determined
geometrically according to the common good, whereas social justice is,
generally, determined arithmetically-i.e., it demands absolute equality.
What accounts for this discrepancy is the basic rift between the classical
world and the modem world: the loss of the natural order as a reference
point for what is true and good. As we saw, the natural order was essential
to the classical understanding of justice.7 The modem philosophers did not
accept this point of reference. They did not believe that there was no order.
Rather, they believed that the order was not normative and could be
manipulated to the end man assigned to that order. Thus, man himself is
now the measuring rod of the world. He must look inside of himself to
determine how to act. This provides a major step forward in politics:
democracy and freedom. But it comes at a very high price; human society
cannot be ordered toward a transcendent good.
In these differences we can understand the difference between
distributive justice and social justice. If there is a transcendent "good" in
the universe, then it makes sense for a polis to distribute common goods to
men in different proportions according to what distribution will best pursue
the common good. However, if there is no transcendent good in the
universe and man himself, each man, must order reality, then the only
logical way to distribute common goods is arithmetically. In other words,
social justice is the perfectly logical transformation of distributive justice
according to modernity's first principles.
But the question must be asked: if we remove God, nature, and the
good, what are the grounds upon which we can stake claims of social
justice? Are there moral grounds for this claim? Is it the naked power of
the positive law under which it becomes policy-the advantage of the
stronger? Or is man some sort of demigod that eams him absolute rights,
notwithstanding the fact that there is no normative order that confers this
status upon him? Here's the point: if we are going to call social justice
some form of justice, it must have a moral grounding. Otherwise we are
invoking moral authority that we do not have; that is, we are lying.
Conservative social justice may have something to contribute here.
Conservative social justice may be a more honest social justice because it
6.
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recognizes the nature of man and the nature of the universe-that is, it is
willing to acknowledge, and thus be bound by, an objective source for its
claims to justice.
The modem philosophers created systems without a normative nature or
God, and those systems form the foundation for our modem societies and
the institutions that govern them. Fortunately, these systems could not
actually alter the metaphysical structure of the universe, and modernity has
failed. Its logical consequences are enshrined in nihilism, which has left
modern man deeply meaningless and anxious, and has given human history
the atrocities of Nazi Germany and Communist Russia.
All of us today, we "postmoderns," realize this failure-most of us
unconsciously. But the cause we assign to this failure divides us. Some say
it failed because there is no order to the universe, and thus the modems'
attempt to manipulate it through reason was doomed from the beginning.
Others believe it failed because there is a normative order in the universe
that is intrinsically tied to the natural order that the modems tried to
manipulate. They tried to use reason to become "master and possessor" of
that order. But in so doing they divorced reason from its source, rendering
it unreasonable.
The conservative will assert the latter argument. He seeks to inherit
what is good from previous generations and tests the res novae against this
standard. It is he who will test the newness of modernity against what he
knows is true about the nature of the world.8 In his conservativism, he thus
maintains a moral ground upon which he is able to stake a claim to social
justice.
In short, my argument is that, in our postmodern world, only a
conservative is capable of making moral claims. And because justice
inherently invokes moral authority, only a conservative can speak about
justice in an intellectually coherent way. Therefore, conservative social
justice is the only brand of social justice that might be honest.
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